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ABSTRAK
 Penelitian ini berupaya untuk mengukur apakah institusi politik memiliki pengaruh signifikan terhadap 
sumber-sumber pertumbuhan ekonomi di negara-negara berkembang. Riset ini menggunakan data panel dari 65 
negara berkembang dengan mengikuti metodologi Pinto dan Timmons. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa 
rezim yang lebih demokratis menurunkan tingkat investasi dan meningkatkan rasio penanaman modal asing 
(PMA) terhadap PDB. Namun, institusi politik di negara berkembang tidak membawa pengaruh yang signifikan 
terhadap tingkat “enrollment” sekunder, suplai tenaga kerja, dan rasio perdagangan terhadap PDB. Penelitian 
ini memperkaya temuan-temuan empiris dalam interaksi antara institusi politik dan kinerja ekonomi, khususnya 
untuk kasus negara berkembang. 
Kata Kunci: ekonomi politik, pertumbuhan ekonomi 
ABSTRACT
 This research attempts to determine if political institutions has significant influences on sources of economic 
growth in developing countries. The research employs panel data of 65 developing countries by following the 
methodology of Pinto and Timmons. The results show that more democratic regime decreases investment rates; 
and increases foreign direct investment to GDP ratio. However, political institutions in developing countries bring 
insignificant effects to secondary enrollment rate, labor supply and trade to GDP ratio. This research enriches the 
empirical findings on interaction between political institutions and economic performance especially for the case 
of developing countries. 
Keywords: political economy, economic growth 
INTRODUCTION
1. Background
Democracy is a widespread recognized universal 
value as it is clearly expressed in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.1 Its worldwide 
campaign goes beyond its effects on economic 
prosperity. Hence, if democracy is a goal in itself, 
a clear understanding of democratization effect 
on economic performance becomes indispensable 
especially for developing countries.
Nowadays, we become witnesses for remark-
able economic achievements of some developing 
countries despite the political regime differences 
e.g. India that represents democratic countries and 
China that represents autocratic countries. On the 
other hand, there are some countries which have 
experienced persistent economic deterioration 
regardless the political regimes e.g. the least 
developed countries. Furthermore, some countries 
face still facing economic difficulties although 
they have transformed political regimes from 
autocratic to democratic, vice versa, e.g. Congo. 
This phenomenon needs better understanding on 
relationships and interaction between political 
institutions and economic performance. 
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2. Problem Statements
Despite the growing interests on empirical 
analyses to examine relationships between 
political institutions and economic performance 
in developing countries, the dedicated research are 
insufficient. The approach of this research to focus 
only on developing countries is motivated by the 
rare political economy studies and a suggestion 
by Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Tan.2 They pointed 
out that despite the growing number of theories 
and research in growth theory, the aggregate 
regression is unable to uncover strong evidence 
of growth determinants. Therefore, Durlauf et 
al suggested researchers pay more attention to 
countries’ details. 
3. Research Objectives
This study attempts to determine:
1. Whether or not political institutions, in 
both democratic and autocratic regimes in 
developing countries, influence the sources of 
economic growth. 
2. Patterns of relationships between political 
institutions and sources of economic growth 
in developing countries. 
4. Literature Review
a. The  Effects of Special Interest Groups on  
 Economic Growth
Helpman3 argued that the very seminal work on 
the effects of political institutions on economic 
growth was that by Olson.4 By employing 
the theory of groups and organization, Olson 
argued that interest groups act solely to benefit 
the members of the groups and hence create 
barriers, in the form of introducing complex legal 
procedures, complicated government bureaucracy 
and other obstacles, that are likely to obstruct the 
implementation of new technology. Furthermore, 
Olson5 offered a supposition that “countries that 
have had democratic freedom of organization 
without upheaval or invasion will suffer the most 
from growth-repressing organizations”. 
However, Olson’s view has been challenged 
by Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi6 
who claimed that declining trend of growth 
has no relationship with age of a regime, either 
democratic or autocratic, Perrson and Tabellini7 
who discovered that more favorable policies in 
pursuit of higher growth were conducted by the 
older democratic countries. Therefore, Helpman 
argued that we still do not have a good theory and 
empirical analysis to explain the link between 
political institutions and economic growth. 
The Effects of Political Regime Differences on 
Economic Growth
Olson’s works attracted many economists to 
undertake research as Przeworski and Limongi8 
counted 18 studies between 1966 and 1992 that 
tested the effects of regime differences (autocracy 
and democracy) on economic growth. Some 
findings favor democracy, some findings favor 
autocracy, while the remainder show indifference 
between political regimes. Therefore, Przeworski 
and Limongi claimed that the evidence is statisti-
cally inconclusive. 
The Effects of Democracy on Some Compo-
nents of Economic Growth
Tavares and Wacziarg9 offered a new methodology 
by decomposing components of economic growth, 
instead of projecting economic growth directly 
onto types of political regimes. They found that 
democracy promotes economic growth by in-
creasing the level of human capital accumulation 
reducing income equality; democracy hampers 
economic growth by decreasing physical capital 
accumulation and increasing the government 
expenditure to gross domestic product (GDP) 
ratio. Thus, Tavares and Wacziarg claimed that 
democracy brings a moderate negative effect to 
economic growth.
The Political Determinants of Economic Per-
formance
Later, Pinto and Timmons10 suggested that effects 
of political institutions on sources of economic 
growth could be explained by employing aug-
mented neoclassical growth theory and the median 
voter theorem. From the augmented neoclassical 
growth theory, they pointed out that the sources of 
economic growth could be decomposed into three 
components, namely accumulation of physical 
capital, accumulation of human capital, and total 
factor productivity. 
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Under the median voter theorem mechanism 
which suggests that voters can utilize their voting 
power to establish income redistribution policies, 
Pinto and Timmons claimed the effects of political 
competition on components of economic perfor-
mance, as shown in Figure 1. Their conclusion is 
that political competition brings negative effects 
to physical capital accumulation, positive effects 
to both human capital accumulation and total 
factor productivity.
3. More democratic regime increases (decreases) 
total factor productivity.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research methods and techniques are mainly 
inspired by and follow the methodology of Pinto 
and Timmons. The methodology is to employ 
a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) panel and 
the three-stage least squares (3 SLS) estimation 
method by using secondary data from respected 
sources. 
1. Model Specification
In general, the econometric formulation is the 
following:
Σ
 Σ
where y is a specific dependent variable, CONT 
are control variables, EXP is the explanatory 
variable, DUM are dummy variables, is the lagged 
dependent variable (LDV), and is the residual. 
As an illustration, the model is graphed as 
shown in Figure 2 followed by detail descrip-
tions.
Competitiveness of Political Participation 
(PARCOMP) is the explanatory variable represents 
political institutions measurement produced by 
POLITY IV. It adduces citizens’ ability to pursue 
policy and leadership in politics with five scores 
from 1 to 5, i.e. repressed, suppressed, factional, 
transitional, and competitive respectively. The 
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Figure 2. Model Illustration
Pinto and Timmons, 2005 (p. 28)
Figure 1. Pinto and Timmons’ political competition 
and sources of growth
5. Research Hypotheses
This research poses three hypotheses that political 
institutions influence the sources of economic 
growth in developing countries in various ways 
as the following. 
1. More democratic regime increases (decreases) 
physical capital accumulation. 
2. More democratic regime increases (decreases) 
human capital accumulation.
 65 countries 
annual data for 31 
years (1977-2007) 
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higher the score, the more competitive, and the 
more democratic a country is.
Four control variables (trade_gdp: trade to 
GDP ratio, real_gdp: real GDP, inc_cap: income 
per capita, and pop/pop_gr: population/population 
growth rate) capture the openness of market, the 
size of market, the country wealth, the country 
size, respectively. This research also employs 
natural logarithm of control variables.
Five dependent variables represent sources 
of economic growth (inv_gdp: investment to GDP 
ratio, lab_sup: labor supply relative to population, 
sec_en: secondary enrollment rate, trade_gdp: 
trade to GDP ratio, and fdi_gdp: foreign direct 
investment to GDP ratio). 
2. Unit Analysis and Other Explanations
Dataset are chosen from 65 countries for 31 years 
(1977–2007) selected by criterions: (i) classified 
by the World Bank as developing countries 
in 2008, (ii) population exceeding 1 million 
people, (iii) no problems of fragmentation or 
unification.
Beside the annual country data, 5-year 
average data is employed to reduce possibility of 
business cycle during several years in a particular 
country. Furthermore, this research employs two 
dummy variables, namely, country dummies to 
control level differences across countries; and 
year dummies to control year-specific shocks 
common to all countries.
Three-stage least square (3SLS) estimation 
method is operated to deal with problems of 
endogeneity and simultaneity. Instrumental 
variables used are lags of political indices. 
Moreover, the lagged dependent variable (LDV) 
model has been employed as recommended by 
Beck and Katz11 for dynamic specification in 
time-series cross section (TSCS). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
This research presents regression results of 
annual data as shown in Table 1. The econometric 
estimation for the 5-year average data sample 
has been undertaken, however, the results are 
not reported because the findings are broadly 
consistent with the annual data regression results. 
The odd columns exhibit regression results for 
country dummies, meanwhile the even columns 
for year dummies. 
1. Investment to GDP Ratio
PARCOMP index has significant and negative 
relationships with the investment to GDP ratio 
(significant at 5%).  As column 1 of Table 1 
exhibits, a positive 1-point change in the PAR-
COMP index reduces the investment to GDP 
ratio by 0.25%. Thus, the maximum reduction in 
the investment level for the 5-point PARCOMP 
is 1.3%. 
The evidence shows that more competitive 
regimes will have lower levels of capital formation 
(investment) relative to the gross domestic product 
ratio. In other words, the relationship between 
investment level and political competition is 
negative. 
Indeed, Pinto and Timmons found a robust 
negative relationship between PARCOMP and 
investment levels. Similarly, Tavares and Wacz-
iarg claimed that democracy decreases investment 
rates due to the reason that the government under 
more competitive regimes put a greater value on 
people (who has voting power) than the capital. 
However, both of the previous research utilized 
OECD countries which have more data and 
might drive the results to reflect the situation of 
developed countries more than of developing 
countries. 
2. Secondary Enrollment Rate
PARCOMP index has insignificant and negative 
relationships with secondary enrollment as shown 
in column 3 and 4 of Table 1. The primary data 
evidence shows that more competitive regimes 
will have lower levels of secondary enrollment 
is very weak, thus, this research is unable to 
conclude the relationship between secondary 
enrollment and political competition. 
This conclusion is contrary to Pinto and 
Timmons’ finding of a robust positive relationship 
between political democratization and secondary 
enrollment and to Tavares and Wacziarg’s claim 
that “higher level of democracy leads to higher 
educational attainment”. 
However, Baum and Lake12 found that there 
is a positive and significant relationship between 
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democracy and secondary enrollment in non-poor 
countries (per capita income more than 2,500 
USD), whereas the relationships is insignificant 
for poor countries. If we consider that all of the 
developing countries could be classified as poor 
countries, the evidence of this research is similar 
to that of Baum and Lake in terms of lack of 
significant connector. 
This research is unable to discover a 
significant pattern between political competi-
tion and secondary enrollment. One possible 
explanation for this inability is perhaps due to 
data insufficiency, as one third of the subsample 
data are not being included. Another explanation 
could be the confirmation of the finding by Baum 
and Lake. Therefore, our tentative conclusion is 
that political competition in developing countries 
has no significant relationship with the secondary 
enrollment rate.
3. Labor Supply
PARCOMP index has insignificant and negative 
relationships with labor supply as shown in 
column 5 and 6 of Table 1. The data shows weak 
evidence that more competitive regimes will have 
lower levels of labor supply relative to population. 
In other words, this research is unable to conclude 
the relationship between labor supply and political 
competition. 
This finding is contrary to Pinto and Tim-
mons’ finding of a robust negative relationship 
between political democratization and labor 
supply. Unfortunately, we are unable to find the 
reason behind this finding because there is not 
much research that has been done in testing how 
democracy or political competition affects labor 
supply which could be compared to evidence in 
this research. 
4. Trade to GDP Ratio
PARCOMP index has insignificant and positive 
relationships with the trade to GDP ratio as shown 
in column 7 and 8 of Table 1. The data shows 
weak evidence that the more competitive regimes 
will have higher levels of trade to gross domestic 
product ratio. In other words, we cannot conclude 
that relationship generally exist between trade and 
political competition. 
Indeed, Pinto and Timmons also found 
similar evidence to this research which shows 
unclear support to the hypothesis. Meanwhile, 
Tavares and Wacziarg discovered that democracy 
tends to lower the trade openness. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dependent Variables
Dependent Variables t-1 0.7065*** 0.6826*** 0.9125*** 0.9121*** 0.8367*** 0.6936*** 0.8378*** 0.8403*** 0.8041*** 0.7285***
(0.0201) (0.0212) (0.0310) (0.0312) (0.0343) (0.0594) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0414) (0.0474)
Trade/GDP (%) 0.0053 0.0069 -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0037 -0.0129*** -0.0163***
(0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0204) (0.0208) (0.0041) (0.0042)
Real GDP/Ln Real GDP 1.4715*** 2.6589*** -0.5222 -0.4822 0.0010 0.0021 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.4022) (0.5547) (0.5318) (0.6757) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Real GDP 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.1113 -0.4746 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0002*** 0.0000
per Capita (US$) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.2349) (0.2895) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Population -0.0035 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0034 0.0186 -0.0152 0.0146 0.0084 0.0041 -0.0013
(Millions) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0489) (0.0498) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Political -0.2573** -0.1465 -0.1162 -0.1297 -0.1438 -0.8461 0.3657 0.1079 0.2739*** 0.0620
Competition t-1 (0.1104) (0.1168) (0.1391) (0.1487) (1.0114) (1.0622) (0.2489) (0.2925) (0.0813) (0.0906)
Constant -2.8227* 5.8541*** 14.8662** 14.4829** 3.5583 30.5982 21.2204*** 18.6839*** -3.6536 2.7992
(1.4820) (1.2655) (6.3962) (7.0321) (3.8069) (49.2333) (3.5520) (4.0186) (3.6700) (2.3639)
Observation 1857 1857 1664 1664 347 347 1857 1857 1711 1711
R-square 0.8988 0.8988 0.8912 0.8912 0.9489 0.9489 0.9235 0.9235 0.8924 0.8924
Dummies Country Year Country Year Country Year Country Year Country Year
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Trade/GDP FDI/GDP (%)Investment
to GDP (%)
Labor Supply Secondary
Enrollment (%)
Table 1. Regression Results of the Effects of Political Institutions on Sources of Economic Growth (3 SLS)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dependent Variables
Dependent Variables t-1 0.7065*** 0.6826*** 0.9125*** 0.9121*** 0.8367*** 0.6936*** 0.8378*** 0.8403*** 0.8041*** 0.7285***
(0.0201) (0.0212) (0.0310) (0.0312) (0.0343) (0.0594) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0414) (0.0474)
Trade/GDP (%) 0.0053 0.0069 -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0037 -0.0129*** -0.0163***
(0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0204) (0.0208) (0.0041) (0.0042)
Real GDP/Ln Real GDP 1.4715*** 2.6589*** -0.5222 -0.4822 0.0010 0.0021 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.4022) (0.5547) (0.5318) (0.6757) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Real GDP 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.1113 -0.4746 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0002*** 0.0000
per Capita (US$) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.2349) (0.2895) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Population -0.0035 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0034 0.0186 -0.0152 0.0146 0.0084 0.0041 -0.0013
(Millions) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0489) (0.0498) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Political -0.2573** -0.1465 -0.1162 -0.1297 -0.1438 -0.8461 0.3657 0.1079 0.2739*** 0.0620
Competition t-1 (0.1104) (0.1168) (0.1391) (0.1487) (1.0114) (1.0622) (0.2489) (0.2925) (0.0813) (0.0906)
Constant -2.8227* 5.8541*** 14.8662** 14.4829** 3.5583 30.5982 21.2204*** 18.6839*** -3.6536 2.7992
(1.4820) (1.2655) (6.3962) (7.0321) (3.8069) (49.2333) (3.5520) (4.0186) (3.6700) (2.3639)
Observation 1857 1857 1664 1664 347 347 1857 1857 1711 1711
R-square 0.8988 0.8988 0.8912 0.8912 0.9489 0.9489 0.9235 0.9235 0.8924 0.8924
Dummies Country Year Country Year Country Year Country Year Country Year
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Trade/GDP FDI/GDP (%)Investment
to GDP (%)
Labor Supply Secondary
Enrollment (%)
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5. FDI to GDP Ratio
PARCOMP index has significant and positive 
relationships with FDI to GDP ratio in the data 
(significant at 1%) as shown in column 9 of Table 
1. As Columns 9 exhibits, a positive 1-point 
change in the PARCOMP index increases the 
FDI to GDP ratio by 0.27%. Thus, the maximum 
improvement in the FDI level for the 5-point 
PARCOMP is 1.35%. 
The evidence shows that more competitive 
regimes will have higher levels of foreign direct 
investment relative to gross domestic product. In 
other words, the relationship between the foreign 
direct investment and political competition is 
positive. This finding is similar to Pinto and 
Timmons’ evidence. If this is true, we may infer 
that political competition has a positive and 
significant association to the FDI to GDP ratio in 
developing countries.
CONCLUSIONS
This research conducted an empirical analysis 
approach for investigating the effects of political 
competition on economic performance with 
focusing only to a sample of countries that is 
chosen from the same stage of development i.e. 
developing stage. Thus, we are able to examine 
the sources of economic growth by decomposing 
the sources of economic growth in developing 
countries. 
1. Significant Findings
Significant findings from this research as fol-
lows:
1) More democratic regime in developing 
countries decreases physical capital ac-
cumulation by reducing investment rates.
2) More democratic regime in developing 
countries increases total factor productivity 
by attracting foreign direct investment.
3) Political institutions in developing countries 
do not matter to labor supply (physical 
capital accumulation); secondary enrollment 
rate (human capital accumulation); and trade 
to GDP ratio (total factor productivity).
2. Research Contributions 
If those findings are true, we may conclude 
specific pattern of relationships between political 
institutions and sources of economic growth in 
developing countries as follows:
1) The findings that more democratic regime 
reduces the rate of investment, and promotes 
FDI at the same time shows off-setting 
(cross-cutting) effect of political institutions 
on sources of economic growth. The findings 
confirm Pinto and Timmons’ empirical 
result. 
2) Political institutions do not matter to 
secondary enrollment rate which is contrary 
to major research including Pinto and 
Timmons’ finding that claimed democratic 
regimes increases human capital accumula-
tion.
3) Political institutions do not matter to labor 
supply which is contrary to what Pinto and 
Timmons’ finding that more democratic 
regime decreases labor supply.
Hence, this research has enriched existing 
understanding on pattern of relationships between 
political institutions and economic performance 
in developing countries. 
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